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A broad stroke or different strokes for different folks? Examining the 
subtleties in crisis management approaches in state-owned enterprises 
and privately owned enterprises in China
Augustine Pang*, Yang Hu and Eugene Woon
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore
Several previous studies have been conducted to examine China’s management of in-
ternal crises, but few have investigated the approaches to crisis management used by 
domestic Chinese organizations. It is critical to study these organizations because their 
approaches exemplify the intricacies of crisis management at the local level. In China, 
there are two main types of organizations: state-owned enterprises (SOE) and privately 
owned enterprises (POE). This study aimed to determine how their business orienta-
tions led to different styles of crisis management in terms of media relations, govern-
ment relations, and crisis responses. The findings showed that SOEs sought shelter from 
the government, whereas the POEs sought goodwill from the government. The SOEs 
sought to control the media, whereas the POEs sought to circumvent media exposure. 
The SOEs predominantly employed the barnacle strategy in their crisis responses and 
occasionally used third-party endorsements and set up new topics, whereas the POEs 
employed third-party endorsements and set up new topics.
Keywords: crisis communication; crisis response strategies; government relations; 
 media relations
Introduction
The Sanlu Group, a former Chinese dairy giant and a quintessential Chinese state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), was confronted with the melamine contamination milk crisis in 2008. 
Its products were blamed for causing the deaths of at least six babies and damaging the 
kidneys of about 294,000 babies. Sanlu was criticized for its crisis management, which 
resulted in its collapse several months later.
The scholarly attention to crisis management in China has increased because of the 
growing international prominence of this country. Previous studies examined how the 
Chinese government managed the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis in 
2003 (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2007), the recalls of Chinese products in 2007 (Cai, Lee, & 
Pang, 2009), and the Sichuan earthquake in 2009 (Chen, 2009). Although these crises led 
scholars to realize the urgent need to study Chinese domestic organizations, few studies 
have investigated their approaches to crisis management.
In the context of China’s growing economy, it is critical to compare privately owned 
enterprises (POEs) and SOEs. SOEs are owned by the Assets and Supervision and Admin-
istration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and by provincial, municipal, and 
county governments. SASAC administers 17 SOEs, appraises their operations, and hires 
and dismisses managers (Kang, 2014). SOEs lead the Chinese market, generating about 
75% of China’s industrial output (Child & Tse, 2001) and serving key roles in industries 
that are essential for national development. Although they are publically owned, SOEs still 
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receive huge state support, which places POEs in a comparatively disadvantaged position 
(He, Chiu, & Zhang, 2015).
POEs are economic units that are invested in or controlled by individuals, including 
limited liability corporations, shareholding corporations, partnership enterprises, and sole 
investment enterprises (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2012). POEs are bankrolled and operated 
by owners who employ workers who perform profit-making tasks (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 
2012). According to Tong and Junarsin (2013), Chinese POEs are characterized by their 
legal constraints, lack of resources and governmental support, and small corporate size 
because of their comparatively short history. Such organizations are controlled by their 
owners, who have exclusive authority (Schlevogt, 2001), and standardized organizational 
chains of command (Leung, 1995), formality, and bureaucracy (Weidenbaum, 1996).
Their unique business orientations, organizational structures, corporate cultures, and 
communication mechanisms may lead to different styles of crisis management (Joseph, 
2013). Hence, this study examines the differences between SOEs and POEs in terms of 
government and media relations and crisis response strategies (CRS). Presently, no official 
reports have consolidated the numbers, types, and kinds of crises that involve POEs and 
SOEs in China. It is conceivable that some may have been concealed. However, anecdotal 
evidence collected by the authors showed that China experienced at least 26 major crises 
between 2005 and 2015, including 11 industrial accidents (42.3%), eight environmen-
tal/natural disasters (30.8%), four food and drug safety/product recall scandals (15.4%), 
and three allegations of poor business practice/product standards (11.5%). A list of crises 
involving Chinese SOEs and POEs, including 12 POEs (46.2%) and 14 SOEs (53.8%), is 
provided in Appendix 1. Because of the frequency and magnitude of such crises, the pres-
ent study conducts a timely examination of approaches to crisis management. This study 
addresses the call to explore the relationships among culture, enterprise ownership, and 
crisis management approaches (Huang, 2012; Pratt, 2012). Ye and Pang (2011) considered 
that Sanlu’s case reflected a typical Chinese approach to crisis management, which raises 
the question of whether such an approach exists.
Data were obtained in interviews with 20 participants who had worked in the top 20 
public relations (PR) firms in China (China International Public Relations Association 
[CIPRA], 2014) or in Chinese POEs or SOEs. It is hoped that the insights gained in this 
study will shed light on the subtle differences in the approaches to crisis management used 
by POEs and SOEs in China.
Literature review
Theoretical lens: contingency theory of strategic conflict management
Coombs (2010a) described the contingency theory of strategic conflict management as a 
“grand theory of public relations”, which “seeks to explain how public relations as a whole 
operates” (p. 41). Citing Botan (2006), Coombs (2010a) argued that a grand theory “helps 
us to understand what guides policy-level decisions an organization makes about goals, 
alignments, ethics, and relationships with publics and other forces in its environment” 
(p. 41). It begins by seeking to explain an entire discipline and “can be adapted to specific 
areas of the discipline” (Coombs, 2010a, p. 41). Originating in the field of PR, contingency 
theory is now among the six theories that are the most frequently applied in crisis commu-
nication research (An & Cheng, 2010).
Contingency theory assumes that strategic communication is practiced dynamically 
and examined through a continuum, whereby organizations practice a variety of stances 
at a given time for a given public depending on the circumstances (Pang, Jin, & Cameron, 
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2010). It examines stance movements via a continuum in which advocacy is at one end 
and accommodation is at the other end. The theory has a matrix of 87 factors that are 
categorized as predisposing, situational, or proscriptive, which an organization can draw 
on to determine its stance. Between advocacy (arguing for a position) and accommodation 
(acceding to demands) is a range of operational stances that influence organizational strat-
egies. Previous empirical studies that applied contingency theory found that several key 
factors affected stance movements.
The role of the government in times of crises
The government plays a critical role during crises, particularly those with national and 
international ramifications. The political realism of the government, which is manifested 
in its need to prioritize stakeholders, was found to be a factor in determining stance move-
ments (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2006; Pang, Jin, & Cameron, 2004; Zhang, Qiu, & Cameron, 
2004). Ye and Pang (2011) found that Sanlu depended on government support to overcome 
the crisis. Li, Cropp, and Jin (2010) also found that government support and the degree of 
political support for organizations were influential factors in managing conflict in China.
The importance of the media in times of crises
The media are often demonized as an enemy but they play an integral role as “an informa-
tion resource in both gathering and dispersing information” (Veil & Ojeda, 2010, p. 422). 
The government has recognized the media’s role in strategic communication during crises 
(Jin et al., 2006). Meeting the media’s needs and remaining accessible by them remain 
one of the best practices in crisis communication (Seeger, 2006). Sanlu was found to be 
cognizant of this practice even though its stance “oscillated between advocacy and accom-
modation” (Ye & Pang, 2011, p. 260). Li, Cropp, Sims, and Jin (2012) found that “the inter-
section of media, media relations, and government is often difficult to discern” (p. 708).
Crisis response
The crisis communication research on shaping organizational strategies in response to a 
crisis has relied on image repair theory (IRT) and situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT). According to SCCT, CRS can be used to protect reputational assets after the 
organization has instructed stakeholders in their actions during crises (Coombs, 2008). It 
offers 10 CRSs: attacking the accuser; denying; scapegoating; making excuses; justifying; 
ingratiating; showing concern; compensating; showing regret; and apologizing.
Described as the “dominant paradigm for examining corporate communication in times 
of crises” (Dardis & Haigh, 2009, p. 101), IRT offers five major typologies (Benoit & 
Pang, 2008): denial; evasion of responsibility; reducing offensiveness; corrective action; 
and mortification. These strategies have been integrated with contingency theory to exam-
ine stance movements and strategies (Jin et al., 2006, 2007; Pang et al., 2004; Ye & Pang, 
2011).
China’s contextual factors and crisis communication practices
Huang (2012) suggested that cultural dynamics and political and media systems play a part 
in crisis communication because they are among the most important factors in explaining 
the differences between societies with identical cultures. China’s culture involves group 
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relationships, strict power structures, and risk aversion. For example, organizations tend 
to invite a third party to be involved in a crisis in order to persuade the public and build 
a support community. This strategy reflects the collectivism and group-oriented relation-
ships in traditional Chinese culture. Ye and Pang (2011) posited that unique characteristics, 
such as face and high uncertainty avoidance, are important cultural considerations in crisis 
management. These characteristics are manifested through implicit communication that is 
“contained, reserved, implicit, and indirect” (Gao & Ting-Toomey, 1998). Hu and Pang 
(2016) argued that social stability is the government’s priority in crisis communication, 
especially when SOEs are involved, which influences the media and then the organiza-
tion’s CRS. By placing the literature in the Chinese context, this study examines three 
key factors that influence the approaches to crisis management by SOEs and POEs in the 
country.
Political factor: role of the government in times of crises
It would be fair to argue that the Chinese government has been a pervasive presence in 
times of national crises, such as its stringent media control during the SARS (Chen, 2008) 
and Sanlu (Lyu, 2012; Veil & Yang, 2012) crises. When it did not play an overtly assertive 
role, it would still assume a covertly leading role. During the Sichuan earthquake in 2009, 
the government announced the establishment of a comprehensive information network, 
which required all local and regional administrative departments to provide the latest 
information in times of crises (Meng & Berger, 2008). The government also coordinated 
the close collaboration of the monitoring networks in several northern Chinese provinces. 
Because of government’s dominant influence in times of crisis, the first research question 
is posed as follows:
RQ1: How do SOEs and POEs relate to the government in times of crisis?
Media relations: organizations’ use of the media in times of crises
The Chinese media, which are known as “Party Publicity Inc.” (Veil & Yang, 2012), main-
tain political fidelity and relationships with the state and its principles in order to thrive 
and generate earnings (Pan, 2000). The government’s media relations strategies include 
manipulation and direct intervention (Chen, 2009), and it utilizes many tools to control the 
news (Chen, 2008). Moreover, SOEs may bribe journalists to conceal or overlook negative 
news. During the milk crisis, media manipulation was evident in Sanlu’s use of its adver-
tising contract to induce a lack of media coverage. The company also sought the provincial 
government’s aid in controlling the media (Veil & Yang, 2012). Based on this evidence, the 
second research question is posed as follows:
RQ2: How do SOEs and POEs conduct media relations in times of crisis?
Crisis response: strategies employed by Chinese organizations
Unique characteristics have been identified in the strategies used in China, which were 
predominantly shaped by its culture. Three strategies have been identified in crisis 
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responses. The first strategy is to remain silent. Yu and Wen (2003) argued that because 
Chinese are socialized by the cultural maxim of “trouble is born out of the words you 
speak” (p. 54), they remain silent when faced with ambiguous conditions. This ideology 
permeates Chinese society, and organizations are predisposed to avoid difficult conver-
sations (Yu & Wen, 2003), which results in vague or ambiguous communication (Sim & 
Fernando, 2010). During the milk crisis, Sanlu remained silent for a long time before issu-
ing a statement (Ye & Pang, 2011). The second strategy is to save face. The Chinese maxim 
“domestic shame should not be made public” means that organizations should avoid expos-
ing scandals to save face (Yu & Wen, 2003), which suggests that concealment is prevalent. 
Denial is also a strategy used to save face (Cai et al., 2009). Third, organizations take the 
“upper level line” by relying on powerful organizations and prominent individuals to help 
resolve crises (Ye & Pang, 2011). Chinese organizations in crisis usually “spend much 
time taking the “upper level line” [rather] than dealing with the media” (Liang, 2005, 
p. 15), believing that the government’s control of the media protects them from a media 
siege (Liang, 2005). Because of structural differences between SOEs and POEs, the third 
research question is posed as follows:
RQ3: What CRSs do POEs and SOEs use in times of crises?
Method
Interview
In-depth interviews offer a wealth of detailed information that sheds light on the phenom-
enon under examination (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000). In this study, the semi-structured 
interview method was adopted to allow freedom and flexibility in asking questions in addi-
tion to those on the list of prepared interview questions,1 which were based on the literature 
review and the Chinese context.
Data collection
Twenty participants were selected based on the following requirements:
(1)  Has worked a minimum of three years in one of the top 20 PR companies in Chi-
na (according to China International Public Relations Association [CIPRA] 2014) 
in corporate communication or crisis management functions; or
(2)  Has worked a minimum of five years in a Chinese POE or SOE with experience 
managing corporate crises.
Among the participants, six were from SOEs, five from POEs, and one was from the 
government. The remainder were from PR consultancies, of which five were domestic 
firms and three were international firms. The participants from PR companies were consid-
ered because of their extensive knowledge in consulting for SOEs and POEs. The partici-
pants held positions as CEOs, senior managers, and managers with at least three years of 
experience in the field. The participants included were 5 females and 15 males, who were 
between 35 and 56 years old (Table 1). All were Mainland Chinese who were familiar with 
Chinese cultural contexts, and they had rich experience in corporate crisis management. 
Bowen (2008) described such interviewees as “elite interviews” (p. 278), that is, people 
with domain-specific knowledge and insights.
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Ensuring veracity of data
Of the 20 participants, 17 preferred phone interviews, two agreed to email interviews, and 
one preferred a face-to-face (FtF) interview. While FtF is preferred in conducting interviews, 
email and phone interviews are acceptable (Burns, 2010; Chen & Hinton, 1999; Dimond, 
Fiesler, DiSalvo, Pelc, & Bruckman, 2012; James & Busher, 2009; Mann & Stewart, 2000) 
and useful when participants were too busy or hesitant to meet in person (Boshoff, Alant, 
& May, 2005). Murray and Harrison (2004) argued that non-FtF interviews might mitigate 
discomfort in participants who are unwilling to participate in FtF interviews because of 
speech and mobility issues or self-consciousness about their appearance. The vastness of 
China also imposes distance and time constraints on data gathering. E-mail often facilitates 
the greater disclosure of information, thus further benefiting both the researcher and partic-
ipants (Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; Kim, Brenner, Liang, & Asay, 2003).
Table 1. Profile of respondents.
 Gender and age Position Years of 
 experience
Industry Organization 
types
P1 F 34 PR manager Five Auto POEs
P2 M 42 Senior PR 
 manager
Eight Auto POEs
P3 F Unknown Senior PR 
 manager
Five Finance SOEs
P4 M 39 Manager Five Consulting MNC
P5 F 37 Administration 
executive
Five Food SOEs
P6 M 38 CEO 10 PR Agency Domestic
P7 F 41 Executive VP More than 10 PR Agency MNC
P8 F Unknown Senior manager More than 10 PR Agency Domestic
P9 M 39 CEO More than 10 Real estate POEs
P10 F 42 Party committee 
officer
Six Oil SOEs
P11 F 36 Manager Three PR Agency Domestic
P12 F 37 Senior manager 
assistant
Four PR Agency Domestic
P13 M 42 Manager Three PR Agency Domestic
P14 F 51 Officer Five Oil SOEs
P15 F 42 Senior PR 
 manager
Five Food POEs
P16 M 33 New media 
 manager
Three PR Agency MNC
P17 M 38 PR executive Six Investment SOEs
P18 M Unknown School principal Five Education POEs
P19 M 57 Government 
official
More than 20 Emergency 
management
Government
P20 M 56 Director More than 10 Coal mine SOEs
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With the participants’ permission, the interviewer sent them a summary of the inter-
view and follow-up questions for verification. The participants were also informed that 
they had the opportunity to supplement their answers within two weeks of the interviews. 
The FtF interview took about 45 minutes. Each email interview took between 30 and 60 
minutes. Most of the telephone interviews were completed within 30 minutes.
Regardless of the type of interview, careful attention was paid to ensure the verac-
ity of the data. First, because this study sought to examine the differences between 
SOEs and POEs in terms of government and media relations and CRS, the interviewees 
expressed an “external truth” (p. 75), which fulfilled the first criterion of the consensus 
theory (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). The study demonstrated a relatively narrow 
scope because it did not examine any complex, intangible, or ambiguous concepts 
(Baker & Edwards, 2012), and it did not require a large volume of interviews to be 
conducted (Bonde, 2013). The interviewees were asked the same set of questions (Guest 
et al., 2006), which aided in achieving data saturation. Second, there was independence 
of views. Each interview was conducted privately and each response was independ-
ent of other responses. Third, the data were categorized to create a domain structure 
for the analysis (McLeod, 2003), which fulfilled the criterion that the questions must 
contribute to a consistent sphere of knowledge (Guest et al., 2006). Because multiple 
interviews occurred within the study period, the cross-examination of interviewees was 
likely to yield the cross-fertilization of the interpretations (Murray & Sixsmith, 1998), 
thus contributing to augmentation of analysis and question generation (Hamilton & 
Bowers, 2006). Third, there was homogeneity (Guest et al., 2006) among the interview-
ees because they were senior practitioners who were chosen based on specific selection 
criteria. This homogeneity resulted in considerably similar responses (Bryman, 2012; 
Newman, 1957), which allowed this study to reach saturation with a small sample size, 
which previous studies found acceptable (Guest et al., 2006; Pang, Tan, Lim, Kwan, & 
Lakhanpal, 2016; Romney, Batchelder, & Weller, 1986). The interviews were conducted 
from mid-September to the end of November 2014, and all data were translated from 
Mandarin into English.
Data analysis
Verbatim transcripts formed the data set and the units of analysis. The analysis was 
conducted using McLeod’s (2003) stages of immersion, categorization, phenomenologi-
cal reduction, triangulation, and interpretation. In the immersion stage, the interview data 
were read and re-read to identify units of meaning that were classified into categories and 
sub-categories. The research questions were used to create a domain structure that was 
used to analyze the data collected in the interviews. LeCompte and Schensul (1999) stated 
that analysis begins by re-reading the data to identify descriptive code domains. Codes are 
“names or symbols used to stand for a group of similar items, ideas, or phenomena that 
the researcher has noticed in his or her data set” (Lancy, 1993, p. 55). They can be based 
on categories that match the theories and on categories that are included in the research 
questions.
To create a domain structure for the data analysis using the research questions, the texts 
related to “government”, “media”, “SOEs”, or “POEs” were highlighted. The main points 
in the participants’ descriptions of crisis management processes were then summarized. To 
address RQ3, the operational definitions of different CRS (denial, attack accuser, etc.) were 
identified by referring to the key characteristics in IRT and SCCT. All responses were first 
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highlighted and investigated by examining the latent contents (Krippendorff, 2004). The 
highlighted texts were coded using the predetermined categories. If multiple latent contents 
were identified in some responses, they were coded as different strategies. Data that could 
not be coded into these categories were coded as “other”. After the analytical coding, each 
category was examined to determine whether sub-categories were needed. Data that could 
not be coded into the CRS categories derived from the theories were re-examined to deter-
mine their characteristics.
Through the process of immersion, further insights emerged from the data. Inductive 
thinking was then adopted. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) claimed that inductive reasoning is 
effective in creating coding categories if there is not enough former knowledge about the 
phenomenon. To address RQ1 and RQ2, by reviewing all data related to “government”, 
“media”, “SOEs”, or “POEs”, the meanings were derived and summarized into themes 
or patterns. For instance, a participant mentioned, “the SOE tried to launch a new project 
after the crisis”. Hence, “launching a new project” and “SOE” were highlighted; “needed 
the government’s help” was also highlighted to explore the deep connections between 
the government and the SOE. To address RQ3, in several instances, some responses that 
could not be assigned to any crisis response repertoire in IRT and SCCT were classi-
fied as “others”. By reviewing these responses, the authors summarized their themes: (i) 
“Following central government closely” was mainly used by SOEs; (ii) “Gaining third-
party endorsement” was mainly employed by POEs; and (iii) “Setting up new topics” was 
mainly adopted by POEs. In the phenomenological reduction stage, stages one and two 
were revisited and revised as the meanings emerged and the categories were developed. 
A cyclical process occurred. After revisiting the categories, the data were triangulated; a 
sorting process was conducted to identify categories that were recurrent, less significant, 
invalid, or missing. In the interpretation stage, the categories and sets of relationships were 
interpreted to determine their relationships to established definitions, concepts, or theories.
Findings
RQ1 concerned how SOEs and POEs relate to the government in times of crisis.
Seeking shelter from the government
All the participants emphasized that SOEs had a dependent relationship with the govern-
ment during a crisis. The primary stakeholder in SOEs is the government. One participant 
said: “The top leaders in the SOEs are more concerned with ‘government relations’ instead 
of ‘public relations’. ... By communicating with the government, the company can control 
it [the crisis].”
Some participants argued that SOEs sought shelter from the government when they 
were dealing with crises. One participant explained, “The SOEs in our country have a 
unique corporate structure, and the government behaves like their parent. When the child 
makes a mistake, the parent had to come forward to solve the problem.” Another respond-
ent said: “The government would like to help control the whole situation, which contrib-
utes to the SOEs’ dependency on it.”
Such dependence also provides much-needed resources. One participant said that 
SOEs suffering from large-scale crises would need “the government to provide manpower 
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and material resources to survive”. Another said: “The SOEs attach great importance to the 
government and authorities, but don’t take the publics, consumers, and others seriously. 
... They think of the higher-ups in the government as the ‘imperial sword’ [a symbol of 
high authority, vesting the bearer with discretionary power].” A third added, “The central 
government would take over crisis management in most instances, including releasing 
information, holding press conferences, overseeing rescue missions, and sometimes even 
apologizing to the public. The companies usually keep silent or a low profile by being 
absent from press conferences.”
In explaining the reason that government officials, instead of the leaders in SOEs, were 
often seen as fronting the crisis, such as hosting press conferences, several participants 
mentioned, “SOEs belong to the country as the term suggested. ... When the SOEs have 
any crisis, they would tend to seek assistance or even protection from the government.”
According to the participants, the severity of an SOE’s crisis was also largely influenced 
by the government’s decisions. Taking the oil spill case as an example, one participant said:
“If the government intended to go deep into the matter and punish some officials, it would 
become a serious crisis. If the government believed that some officials need to be protected in 
some way, it would divide the responsibility and make the issue look less serious.”
Seeking goodwill with the government
All the participants agreed that because government policies greatly influence POEs in 
many ways, maintaining good ties with and seeking the goodwill of the government were 
crucial. One participant said: 
POEs don’t need to consider much about political influence and can focus on containing losses 
during the crisis. The Chinese government has an overall control over the businesses of all 
companies. ... Everything needs to be supervised by the government, like the tax payment, 
certificate approval, and other regulations. They need to maintain a good relationship with the 
government.
One reason that POEs solicit the government’s help is to smoothen the process should a 
crisis occur. Another is to seek government-linked entities for third-party endorsement. 
One participant mentioned that an IT company managed an intellectual property crisis by 
referring it to the State Intellectual Property Office because of its authority in the field. 
Consumers are inclined to believe the third party and trust the authorities, particularly if it 
is government-related, instead of the POE.
RQ2 concerned how SOEs and POEs conduct media relations in times of crisis.
Controlling the media
SOEs usually do not need to conduct media relations because they have close, indirect 
connections with the media via the government. The government can instruct the media 
not to sensationalize the crisis but to publicize moving stories and report positive news in 
order to divert the public’s attention from criticizing the SOE. One participant mentioned, 
“through the frequent [positive] media reports about how the SOEs saved people and dealt 
with the crisis’ aftermath ... people’s attention would be diverted from the crisis and they 
would forget their sadness”.
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Other ways that the media help SOEs include downplaying the severity of the crisis. 
One participant said: “We were told to downplay events and not to worsen the war of words 
because of the strong government backing we have. The local government pressured us 
to keep a low profile.” Second, instead of casting the media spotlight on the crisis, less 
frequent reporting is preferred. Third is not reporting the organization in a negative light. 
One interviewee said: “Once the media receive word from the government, it will not 
fabricate negative news about the company.” Another said: “The media will consider twice 
before reporting negative news about the SOEs.”
Some participants perceived that SOEs relied on the government to maintain media 
relations as an effective way of managing a crisis. One participant explained, 
“This might be related to the Chinese leaders’ ethos of keeping a low profile. ... Most Chinese 
CEOs do not like giving media interviews. Especially those with government backgrounds 
will keep a low profile and sometimes even appear a little mysterious to the external public.”
Circumventing media exposure
Many participants mentioned that POEs engage in media relations by circumventing 
media exposure in several ways. First, they solicit political connections to remove negative 
stories. Second, they meet privately with the media to explain the situation. Third, they 
exert economic pressure on the media by either increasing or terminating advertisements. 
One interviewee said:
“In China, many media organizations depend on advertisement revenue to make profits. ... In 
China, with such a huge market, there exist numerous media organizations that are not strictly 
supervised by relevant government departments.”
Another said: “If it is an influential media, we could increase the ads input.”
Fourth, some even resort to bribing the media. One interviewee said: “The company, 
concerned with profit, may find it more economical to divert public attention by bribing the 
media.” Another said: “The professional level of the media varies greatly. Some are prof-
it-oriented. In their eyes, they see only money. ... They would report any news without veri-
fying it and would even fabricate stories when they received money from the companies.”
Fifth, under extenuating circumstances, a POE may attack the media, which a SOE 
would never do. Sixth, some POEs intentionally generate publicity stunts to divert the 
media’s attention from the crisis.
RQ3 concerned the CRSs that SOEs and POEs use in times of crises. The strategies in 
IRT and SCCT were first used to examine the responses. However, the data showed that the 
strategies used resonated with those posited by Hu and Pang (2016); that is, the SOEs and 
POEs in China used unique strategies.
The “barnacle” strategy
The barnacle strategy is the result of the close-knit ties that SOEs have with the government 
and media. Hu and Pang (2016) used the term to describe the practice of “following the 
central government closely.” The “barnacle effect” occurs when SOEs rely on the central 
government to smooth matters and suppress negative voices. For instance, when the central 
government announces the removal of culpable government officials, companies similarly 
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dismiss the respective corporate leaders (Yao, 2014), and when the central government 
apologizes to the public, the companies follow suit (Ming, 2013).
According to the interviewees, the barnacle strategy is evident when the dependence 
of SOEs on “the government is seen as an institutional strategy”, such as when crises are 
downplayed or when messages are communicated through the government. Several partic-
ipants reiterated the symbiotic relationship between government officials and corporate 
leaders; the former hold crisis press conferences on behalf of the latter. One interviewee 
said: “SOEs belong to the country. ... When the SOEs experience a crisis, they tend to seek 
assistance or even protection from the government,” which indicates that the corporate 
leaders’ mindsets mirror those of the government leaders. One interviewee stated that most 
SOE corporate leaders are former government officials or would-be government officials 
who are more concerned about their political careers than about their economic agendas. 
Thus, most SOEs follow implicit “rules” and practices, and none would risk behaving 
differently at crucial moments. The barnacle strategy is habitually employed by SOEs 
during crises.
Setting up new topics
Another strategy commonly used by POEs is setting up new topics (Hu & Pang, 2016). In 
China, instead of clear explanations, companies raise irrelevant topics, dramatize, or create 
publicity stunts to divert attention. For instance, in 2013, the Beijing Times accused the 
spring water sold by Nongfu of being inferior in quality to tap water. The Nongfu chairper-
son called it a “smear campaign” and said he would never yield to “media violence” (He, 
2013). During a press conference, he announced that Nongfu was shutting down produc-
tion of barreled water because of “Beijing’s unfriendly atmosphere”. He claimed, “After 
all, dignity is much more valuable than money” (Xie, 2013). Thus, Nongfu successfully 
diverted the attention of the media and the public from the crisis and raised a public debate 
on media ethics. Some even sympathized with Nongfu and criticized the Beijing Times 
(Zhao, 2013).
Recounting their crisis experiences, the participants mentioned that “setting up new 
topics” was a strategy used by POEs to divert public attention in the short run and avoid the 
negative effects of a crisis in the long run. Some practitioners mentioned that SOEs employ 
this strategy by beginning a new project with the government to divert public attention 
from the crisis and minimize crisis damage. One practitioner suggested, “By developing a 
completely new product, the problematic ones would be replaced right away.”
Third-party endorsement
Third-party endorsement refers to the practice of seeking help and support from experts, 
authorities, and a collective power source that lends power, credibility, and voice to an 
organization floundering in a crisis. In China, it is used by companies to deny accusations, 
minimize the severity of crises, and make public apologies. It is used to supplement strate-
gies that seek to reinforce or demonstrate collective power.
In 2012, the POE the Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Industry Group was accused of produc-
ing “toxic capsules” and sought the help of a health ministry expert to allay public fears. 
The expert pronounced that it would not cause any health hazard and that adults could take 
up to six capsules each day (Yang, 2012). SOEs also resort to third-party endorsements 
to support their statements. In 2013, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
planned to start a new oil refinery in Kunming. Residents strongly opposed the project and 
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conducted two large protests (Zhang, 2013). The CNPC invited environmental protection 
experts and senior engineers from the Institute of Environment Science to attend a press 
conference. There, the experts addressed the public’s doubts (Zhang, 2013). According to 
practitioners, this strategy is a “panacea” that is employed by SOEs and POEs in combina-
tion with different CRS.
Third-party endorsement also includes the reliance on experts or professionals to 
conduct inquiries and submit reviews. One participant stated that a third party’s endorse-
ment was sought to help the company refute accusations and explain technical jargon to 
dissipate public criticism. Third-party advocates, however, must be credible. POEs often 
seek government-linked entities.
Discussion
The findings of this study have several theoretical and practical implications, which are 
discussed in the following sections.
Government power
The government’s power is evident in authoritarian contexts (Jin et al., 2006, 2007; Zhang 
et al., 2004). According to Taylor and Kent (1999), because the government is the most 
important “public”, it should be the target of PR efforts. Liu and Horsley (2007) argued that 
the politics of governance must be considered in relating to and understanding the govern-
ment. In contingency theory, governmental power consists of “source credibility/powerful 
members or connections” (Pang et al., 2010). In China, Ye and Pang (2011) argued that 
the government’s power is so immense that organizations have to rely on it. The findings 
of the present study showed that the power of the Chinese government is manifested in 
several ways.
First, the severity of the crisis is largely determined by the government. Using the 2010 
CNPC oil pipeline explosion in Dalian as an example, one respondent said: “If the govern-
ment wants to dive deep into the matter and punish some officials, it would become a 
serious crisis.” Second, the government’s policy directly influences the business operations 
of SOEs. One respondent said: “The SOEs mingle with the government. ... They always 
seek support from the government to ride through a crisis or launch new projects.” Third, 
the government determines the political career paths of SOE leaders. One respondent said:
The leaders in the SOEs are concerned more about their political career, which is largely deter-
mined by superior government officials. ... If they don’t follow the government’s instructions 
and deal with the crisis on their own, they will definitely cause trouble. It means their political 
career would be ruined.
Fourth, the government’s authority influences the perspectives of customers and stake-
holders, and it leads public opinion. One respondent said: 
The official rank-oriented thinking is deeply rooted in our society. The common people trust 
but are afraid of the officials. When a crisis happens, if the government steps in and helps in 
instructing and inspecting the companies, it would be very effective.
Fan (2010) pointed out that when crises occur in a SOE in China, the top management often 
employs an “ostrich policy”. They take advantage of the government’s political power and 
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seek solace in the government because it protects the SOEs. The approaches used, such 
as the barnacle strategy and setting up new projects, indicated that SOEs draw upon the 
government’s help and benefit from state resources. Because of their status, SOEs must 
rely on the government. First, SOEs do not have a specific mechanism of crisis commu-
nication mechanism. Second, they often do not have established relationships with stake-
holders. Third, SOEs’ passivity contributes to and reflects their reliance on the government. 
At the onset of a crisis, subordinates tend to prevent negative information from reaching 
the leaders. “If public criticism is minimal, they would not take action,” said one inter-
viewee. Fourth, the top managers often do not understand crisis management, and they 
fear that a crisis would tarnish their careers, which explains their customary absence or 
silence during crises. The government’s influence and close relationship with SOEs largely 
determines the dependency of SOEs. During a crisis, the government’s presence and inter-
vention could reassure the public that the problem would be solved properly.
POEs, on the contrary, do not have such direct support. Nevertheless, they realize 
that the government is a key stakeholder in most crises. Although they cannot turn to the 
government for protection, they solicit its help indirectly through third-party endorsement. 
The third-party endorsement strategy could be attributed to the Chinese culture of defer-
ence to authority, which is a “reflection of the old patriarchal system and autocratic monar-
chy” (Hu & Pang, 2016, p. 335) and the power of the group.
How can this inform the practitioner? Relationship building is the foundation of the 
practice of PR (Wilcox, Cameron, & Reber, 2015); therefore, one of the first tasks must be 
to understand how the Chinese government works, regardless of organizational affiliation. 
Collaborating with “credible sources” (Seeger, 2006, p. 240) such as the government is 
one of the best practices in crisis communication. Li et al. (2010) argued that the govern-
ment’s influence is a “unique, important influence on Chinese practitioners”, which could 
be because China’s political system determines how conflict management is practiced.
Work with the media
Instead of characterizing the media as the enemy (Veil & Ojeda, 2010), organizations must 
recognize that in times of crisis the media have the responsibility to report events as fairly 
and truthfully as possible, even if it means portraying the organization in a poor light 
because of how it has managed the issue. Because of the proliferation of online and social 
media, in this age of fake news, alternative facts, and post-truths, the mainstream media 
play an increasingly critical role. George (2012) argued that professional journalists have 
the “discipline of verifying information with multiple sources, institutional memory to 
sense when things are more complex that they seem, and higher order judgment honed 
by experience and specialized beat knowledge” (p. 179). The contingency theory refers 
to these advantages as the power of the media and media coverage. Seeger (2006) charac-
terized “effective communication with the media” (p. 240) as one of the best practices in 
crisis communication.
In China, the media historically have been used as a mouthpiece and have been tightly 
reined. As an administrator, the government has the power to maintain tight and central-
ized control over Chinese media (Zhao, 2008). The Xinhua News Agency, a key govern-
ment-run media organization, often takes the lead in releasing the news when a crisis 
occurs. The reason is that it directly under the State Council, which is the executive arm of 
the Chinese government and acts as the voice of the government. When Xinhua carries the 
story, other newspapers throughout the country swiftly follow suit (Nicholas, 2003). This 
control allows the government to frame how a crisis is viewed domestically and interna-
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tionally. For instance, Xinhua was used to frame China’s efforts in repairing its image after 
a series of recalls involving “made in China” products (Cai et al., 2009).
Because of their deep political connections, SOEs can tap into media resources through 
their governmental connections. Despite such connections, some interviewees recounted 
that the greatest challenge to SOEs during crises was the widespread negative news about 
them. Similarly, even though POEs do not have such media connections, some interview-
ees said that their primary challenge consisted of the negative reports by selected, pres-
tigious media outlets. Therein lies the irony between the two types of organizations: the 
more resources that are available to SOEs, the more they fear the proliferation of bad news. 
Because POEs have fewer resources, they are only concerned about the coverage by a few 
key media outlets.
What are the implications for PR practitioners? The findings of the present study rein-
force the importance of cultivating proactive media relations. Pang (2010) offered the 
Mediating the Media framework. Practitioners and organizations should begin by treat-
ing the media as a crisis ally (Jin et al., 2007). Such changes do not happen overtly or 
overnight. They often require much cultivation, the establishment of pre-crisis relations, 
persuasion, and the sharing of perspectives. According to Jin et al. (2007): “It is a venture 
worth embarking on during peace times so that the rewards can be reaped during crisis 
times.” Li et al. (2012) found that Chinese practitioners must assume their roles as media 
relations counsels. In addition to the traditional media, they need to understand social 
media and international PR. Furthermore, “practitioners are expected to provide media 
training and organize press conferences as needed” (p. 707).
Incorporate proclivity for succinctness and formality as a communication trait
Veil and Yang (2012) argued that crisis communication must take into account unique 
media environments. Coombs (2010b) called for understanding the role of culture in crisis 
communication. In China, for instance, face is an important cultural factor (Ye & Pang, 
2011). According to a Chinese maxim, “domestic shame should not be made public”. 
Hence, Chinese attempt to save face for their organizations whenever possible. “Losing 
face” is tantamount to public humiliation. Thus, in a crisis, covering up dishonorable 
matters is a common strategy used to “save face”. Another cultural factor is that Chinese 
tend to “keep their mouths shut” because they believe that “trouble is born out of the words 
you speak”. Thus, despite their business orientations and structure, because of the Chinese 
proclivity to remain silent, in times of crisis, both SOEs and POEs adhere to the same prac-
tice: the less spoken, the better, regardless of any crisis communication mechanisms, PR 
departments, or myriad of media tools they may have at their disposal.
What implications do these finding have for practitioners? Practitioners can expect 
Chinese organizations to decline to communicate or to divert attention (Yu & Wen, 2003). 
Practitioners should also be sensitive to and work within cultural practices during a crisis 
(Low, Varughese, & Pang, 2011). If mortification is not offered during crises, corrective 
action could serve as pseudo-mortification (Cai et al., 2009) because it is often the organi-
zation’s attempt to save face. The offended party should thus respect this unspoken gesture 
and behave cordially. The persistent pressure on the offending party to apologize may be 
regarded as “taking a yard when given an inch”. Chinese PR practitioners are on the cusp 
of absorbing international business practices, such as openness, while adhering to certain 
indigenous practices (Zhang, Shen, & Jiang, 2009). Therefore, practitioners must under-
stand the effective modes of communication by studying cultural elements and symbols 
as well as the production and reproduction of social meanings (Gaither & Curtin, 2008).
Chinese Journal of Communication  19
Conclusion
This study examined the differences in the crisis management approaches used by SOEs 
and POEs with regard to government and media relations and CRS. One limitation of the 
study is that its findings are based solely on the data collected in interviews with practi-
tioners, which does not allow for the corroboration of their claims. Another limitation is 
that many of the interviews were conducted via emails or phone calls. However, the logis-
tical limitations do not invalidate the findings. Another limitation is that the findings are 
not generalizable to other populations because the study focused on an elite sample and 
specific settings in the Chinese context. However, the findings provide useful insights into 
the approaches that SOEs and POEs use to manage crises. This study responds to Huang’s 
(2012) call for the greater understanding of Chinese culture and “relevant indigenous 
Chinese concepts” (p. 93). Similarly, Pratt (2012) argued for the examination of cultural 
values and the ways in which crisis management is enacted in different “organizational 
contexts” (p. 19).
This exploratory study addressed a gap in the research examining how and why differ-
ent types of organizations within a country manage crises differently. Research on this 
topic is nascent (Coombs, 2010b), particularly in China. It is hoped that the findings of the 
present study will lead to further examinations of the differences between SOEs and POEs 
as well as the differences between agency and in-house approaches to crisis management. 
Future research could examine how domestic and international PR agencies manage crises, 
how the public perceives the CRS employed by SOEs and POEs, and where CRS should be 
located along the specificity-ambiguity continuum (Huang, Lin, & Su, 2005).
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Appendix 1. Types of crises faced by SOEs and POEs
Year Type of crises Organization POE/SOE Cause(s) of Crisis
2015 Preventable  cluster: 
 Organizational 
 misdeeds management 
misconduct
Ruihai International POE The Chinese government had released 
little on the cause of the explosion. 
 Officials and executives were detained 
on suspicion of dereliction of duty or 
abuse of power. 
2014 Preventable cluster: 
 Human-error accidents
Kunshan Zhongrong 
Metal Products 
company.
POE Several were killed in an explosion 
inside a wheel hub polishing workshop 
when a flame was lit. 
2014 Preventable cluster: 
 Organizational man-
agement misconduct
Husi Food Co. POE Husi Food Co. supplied expired and 
unsanitary meat to global brands, which 
resulted in the affected brands apologiz-
ing to their customers. 
2013 Preventable cluster: 
Organizational  
misdeed with injuries
China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec 
Group)
SOE Ignition of vapors from oil leaking from 
a corroded underground pipeline by non 
explosion-proof hydraulic hammer.
2013 Preventable clus-
ter:  Organizational 
misdeeds management 
misconduct
Huatailong Mining 
Development Co. 
Ltd.
SOE Environment and Development Desk 
of the Central Tibetan Administration 
attributed the landslide to aggressive 
mining activity. 
2013 Accidental cluster: 
technical-error accident
Gemudi Company SOE 21 miners were killed in an  colliery 
accident.
2013 Indeterminate Babao Coal Mine Co. SOE The company concealed the death toll 
of the fatal blast and the  government 
released little  information on the crisis’ 
cause.
2013 Preventable cluster:  
Organizational 
 misdeeds with injuries
Taozigou Mine POE 40 were killed in the mine explosion, 
which was caused by high gas density 
generated by coal extraction conducted 
in  “unauthorizedˮ tunnels without proper 
ventilation. 
2013 Accidental cluster: 
Challenges
China  National Petro-
leum  Corporation
SOE Public discontent over opaque 
 environmental assessment process.
2013 Accidental cluster: 
Challenges
Nongfu Spring POE Beijing Times questioned its water quali-
ty and pollution in the water source.
2013 Accidental cluster: 
Challenges
Jiugui Liquor Co. POE with 
strong 
govern-
ment 
support
Business news website reported products 
contained excessive plasticizers.
2012-
2013
Accidental cluster: 
technical-error  
accident
Tianji Coal  Chemical 
Industry Group
SOE A broken pipe spilled tons of chemicals 
into the Zhuozhang River. The public 
and government are not informed until 5 
days later. 
2012 Preventable cluster:  
Organizational mis-
deeds management 
misconduct
Jinchengjiang 
Hongquan  Lithopone 
Material Co. /
Guangxi Jinhe Min-
ing Co.
SOE The government had released little on 
the cause of the cadmium spill. Officials 
managed the spill by diluting and chem-
ically treating it. Guangxi Jinhe Mining 
Co. was suspected as it had repeatedly 
failed to meet national waste disposal 
standards.
(Continued)
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Year Type of crises Organization POE/SOE Cause(s) of Crisis
2012 Preventable cluster: 
 Human-error product 
harm
Xiuzheng 
 Pharmaceutical  
Industry Group
POE State media suspected company of using 
“toxic capsulesˮ.
2012 Preventable cluster: 
 Human-error product 
harm
Yili Group POE High levels of mercury were found in 
the company’s products.
2011 Preventable cluster: 
 Human-error product 
harm
Shuanghui Group POE Clenbuterol was found in meat  products.
2011 Accidental cluster: 
 Technical-errors 
 accidents
ConocoPhillips  
China & China 
 National Offshore  
Oil Corp (CNOOC)
POE 
(Sino- 
foreign 
joint 
 venture)
A series of spills between June and 
July resulted in polluted area 9 times of 
Singapore, which results in farming and 
tourism losses. The pollution is caused 
by an unplugged leak. 
2010 Preventable cluster: 
Organizational  
misdeed management  
misconduct
China National  
Petroleum  
Corporation
SOE Improper desulfurizer injections into oil 
pipeline. 
2010 Preventable cluster: 
Organizational  
misdeed management  
miscoduct
Zijin Mining Group SOE Poor maintenance and negligence.
2010 Accident cluster: 
Technical-errors  
accidents
Jiangsu GPRO  
Group Co.
SOE The explosion was triggered by a gas 
leak from a pipeline at a disused  plastics 
factory owned by the SOE. 
2009 Accident cluster: 
Technical-errors  
accidents
CNPC SOE Diesel spilled into the Yellow River due 
to a broken pipeline but the company has 
closed the leak when it happened.
2009 Preventable cluster:  
Organizational  
misdeeds  
with injuries
Dongling Lead and 
Zinc Smelting  
Company
POE About 2000 children were found to have 
dangerous levels of heavy metals in their 
bodies. This sparked a public outcry 
against smelters that are placing the 
environment and public health at risk.
2008 Indeterminate Guangxi Guangwei 
Chemical Co
SOE An unknown initial explosion caused 
subsequent explosions of combustibles 
which killed 20.
2008 Accident cluster: 
Technical-errors 
accidents
Ganglu Iron and  
Steel Company
POE 17 perished from leaked carbon monox-
ide and the government has shut down 
the blast furnace without additional 
leaks. 
2007 Victim cluster:  
Natural disaster
Huayuan  
Mining Co.
SOE Heavy rains breached the levee of Wen 
river and overwhelmed the mine’s  water 
pumps. The mine flooded and 181 min-
ers perished.
2005 Preventable cluster: 
Organizational  
misdeed with injuries
Jilin Petrochemical 
Company
SOE Management error of mixing benzene 
and nitric acid at high temperature.
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